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In this paper we first recall some notions and results on the coherence-based probabilis-
tic treatment of uncertainty. Then, we deepen some probabilistic aspects in nonmonotonic
reasoning, by generalizing OR, CM, and Cut rules. We also illustrate the degradation of these
inference rules when the number of premises increases. Finally, we show that the lower
bounds obtainedwhen applyingOR andQuasi-Conjunction inference rules coincide, respec-
tively, with Hamacher and Lukasiewicz t-norms; the upper bounds in both rules coincide
with Hamacher t-conorm.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, written in honour of Professor Henry Kyburg, we deepen some aspects of coherence-based probabilistic
nonmonotonic reasoning andwe give, as main result, a generalization of somewell known inference rules. The probabilistic
approach to the logic of conditionals and to nonmonotonic reasoning has been studied by many authors, see e.g. [1,6,8,14,
15,21,36,72,74,82,83,90,91,96,97].
As it has been shown in previous papers, see e.g. [55–57,60], in the setting of coherence we can develop probabilistic
default reasoning with full generality. We recall that the coherence principle of de Finetti plays a basic role in many fields,
such as statistical inference, decision theory, artificial intelligence, and so on. In the setting of coherence we can check
the consistency of probability judgements, without excluding that some (or perhaps all) conditioning events have zero
probability; hence, the coherence-based probabilistic approach to uncertainty can be exploited in all applications, included
cases in which we have a partial or vague knowledge. Two main aspects in coherence-based probabilistic reasoning are:
(i) consistency checking of probability assessments; (ii) coherent extensions of the given assessments. In this context the
fundamental theorem of probability of de Finetti plays a key role. As is well known, this theorem says that, given a probability
assessment P = (p1, . . . , pn) on a family of n events F = {E1, . . . , En} and a further event En+1, there exists a suitable
interval [p′, p′′] ⊆ [0, 1] such that the extension P(En+1) = pn+1 is coherent if and only if pn+1 ∈ [p′, p′′]. In [23] the
fundamental theoremwas formulated as a linear programming problem, by allowing in this way to compute p′, p′′ using the
simplex method. This kind of problems has been studied by many authors; see, e.g. [3,19,20,70,71,78,86]. In this paper we
consider different aspects; in particular:
• we give a review of the coherence-based approach to probability;
• we give a review of the corresponding semantics in probability logic;
• (main result) we give generalizations of the OR, CM (Cautious Monotonicity), and Cut rules that involve more than two
premises;
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• we illustrate, also with numerical examples, the degradation of OR, CM and Cut rules when the number of premises
increases;
• finally, we point out that the lower and upper bounds obtained in OR and Quasi-Conjunction rules coincide with some
well known t-norms and t-conorms, respectively.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we recall some basic notions on betting scheme and penalty criterion; in
Section 3 we recall some basic notions and results on axiomatic conditional probabilities; then, we briefly examine some
aspectswhich concern the checking of coherence and the extension of conditional probability assessments;we alsomention
a connection property which holds for the set of coherent probability assessments on a finite family of conditional events;
in Section 4 we recall basic notions in nonmonotonic reasoning and we deepen some probabilistic aspects; in Section 5
we study a generalization of OR rule; in Section 6 we examine a generalization of CM rule; in Section 7 we consider a
generalization of Cut rule; in Sections 5–7 we also illustrate the degradation of OR, CM and Cut rules when the number of
premises increases; in Section 8 we show that the lower (resp., upper) bounds in OR and Quasi-Conjunction rules coincide
with Hamacher and Lukasiewicz t-norms (resp., Hamacher t-conorm). Finally, in Section 9 we give some conclusions.
2. Betting scheme and penalty criterion
Given any events A and B, we simply denote by AB their conjunction and by A ∨ B their disjunction; moreover, we write
A ⊆ B when A logically implies B. Given any event E, we denote by Ec the negation of E. In the setting of coherence a basic
notion is that of conditional event [40,41]: given two events E andH, withH = ∅, the conditional event E|H is a three-valued
logical entity which is, respectively, true, or false, or void, according to whether E and H are true, or E is false and H is true,
or H is false. If we evaluate P(E|H) = p, we can numerically represent the truth-values of E|H by 1, or 0, or p, respectively.
In the subjective theory of de Finetti [42] probabilities are numerical measures of degrees of beliefs; see also the selection
of papers on, and the excellent introduction to, the subjective probability given in the book of Kyburg and Smokler [75].
Consistent probabilistic assessments can bemade by using two equivalent operative criteria initially introduced by de Finetti
for unconditional events and random quantities: the betting scheme and the penalty criterion, each one based on a suitable
condition of coherence.
Let an arbitrary family of conditional events K be given and a real function P : K → R. Moreover, given a sub-family
F = {E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn} ⊆ K, consider the restriction of P to F represented by the vector P = (p1, . . . , pn), where
pi = P(Ei|Hi), i = 1, . . . , n.
The constituents C0, C1, . . . , Cm relative to the family F are obtained by expanding the expression
n∧
i=1
(EiHi ∨ Eci Hi ∨ Hci ) = · · · = C0 ∨ C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cm,
where
C1 ∨ C2 ∨ · · · ∨ Cm = H1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hn = Hn, C0 = Hc1Hc2 · · ·Hcn = Hcn, m + 1 ≤ 3n.
Of course, when Hcn = ∅ we eliminate C0 from the list of constituents. For each index h, it holds Ch = A1 · · · An, with
Ai ∈ {EiHi, Eci Hi,Hci }. We have, respectively, Ch ⊆ EiHi, or Ch ⊆ Eci Hi, or Ch ⊆ Hci , according to whether Ai = EiHi, or
Ai = Eci Hi, or Ai = Hci . With each constituent Ch contained inHn = H1∨· · ·∨Hn, we associate a pointQh = (qh1, . . . , qhn),
where
qhj =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, if Ch ⊆ EjHj,
0, if Ch ⊆ Ecj Hj,
pj, if Ch ⊆ Hcj .
(1)
We use the same symbols to denote events and their indicators.
Coherence with the betting scheme [73,93,103].
With the pair (F,P) we associate the random gain G|Hn, where
G =
n∑
i=1
siHi(Ei − pi), (2)
and where s1, . . . , sn are n arbitrary real numbers.
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We observe that the value gh of G associated with Ch is given by
gh =
n∑
i=1
si(qhi − pi), h = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Moreover, g0 = 0 and G|Hn ∈ {g1, . . . , gm}. Then, we have
Definition 1. The function P defined on K is coherent if and only if, for every finite sub-family F ⊆ K, one hasmin G|Hn ≤
0 ≤ max G|Hn, for every s1, . . . , sn.
Notice that the condition of coherence can be equivalently expressed as
min G|Hn ≤ 0, ∀ s1, . . . , sn, or max G|Hn ≥ 0, ∀ s1, . . . , sn.
The notion of coherence given in Definition 1 coincides with the notion of coherence with strengthening of de Finetti [42,
vol. 2, Axiom 3, p. 339].
Coherence with the penalty criterion [48,49].
With the pair (F,P) we associate the loss
L =
n∑
i=1
Hi(Ei − pi)2. (3)
For each index h, we denote by Lh the value of L associated with Ch; then we have
Lh =
n∑
i=1
(qhi − pi)2 = PQh2, h = 1, 2, . . . ,m;
i.e., Lh is the square of the distance between P and Qh; moreover, L0 = 0. Given any probability assessment P∗ =
(p∗1, . . . , p∗n) = P on the sub-family F , we denote by L∗ =
∑n
i=1 Hi(Ei − p∗i )2 the loss associated with (F,P∗) and
by L∗h the value of L∗ associated with the constituent Ch. Of course, L∗0 = 0. Then, we have
Definition 2. The function P is coherent if and only if, for every finite sub-family F ⊆ K, denoting by P = (p1, . . . , pn) the
restriction of P to F , there does not exist an assessment P∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) = P such that L∗h ≤ Lh for every h, with L∗h < Lh
for at least a subscript h.
In the context of scoring rules, the penalty criterion is associated with the quadratic scoring rule of Brier [22]. The
relationship between the notion of coherence with the betting scheme and the notion of admissibility with respect to
strictly continuous bounded scoring rules has been studied in [62].
The result below, obtained in [48] by using the penalty criterion, extends to the case of conditional events the geometrical
interpretation of coherence given by de Finetti for unconditional events and random quantities.
Theorem 1. The function P defined on K is coherent if and only if, for every finite sub-family F ⊆ K, denoting by I the convex
hull of the points Q1, . . . ,Qm, one has P ∈ I .
Definition 2 unifies the cases of unconditional and conditional events; moreover, it is equivalent [48] to the notion of
coherence with strengthening of de Finetti and to that one based on Definition 1, studied in [73,93,103]. The proof given
in [48] of the equivalence between Definitions 1 and 2 was suggested by an anonymous referee; a different proof, by an
alternative theorem, is obtained by the following steps [52]:
1. TheconditionP ∈ I is equivalent to solvabilityof the following system (S) in the (nonnegative)unknownsλ1, . . . , λm
(S) :
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
m∑
h=1
λhqhj = pj, j = 1, . . . , n;
m∑
h=1
λh = 1, λh ≥ 0, h = 1, . . . ,m.
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2. In the betting scheme, the existence of n real numbers s1, . . . , sn such that it holds gh = ∑ni=1 si(qhi − pi) < 0, for
every h = 1, . . . ,m, i.e.max G|Hn < 0, amounts to solvability of the following system (in the unknowns s1, . . . , sn)
() :
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
n∑
i=1
si(q1i − pi) < 0,
.................................
n∑
i=1
si(qmi − pi) < 0.
3. By an alternative theorem [46, Theorem 2.9], exactly one of the following alternatives holds: (i) (S) has a solution; (ii)
() has a solution.
4. Then, the condition max G|Hn ≥ 0, ∀ s1, . . . , sn (which means that () has no solutions), is satisfied if and only if
(S) is solvable; or, equivalently,max G|Hn ≥ 0, ∀ s1, . . . , sn, if and only if P ∈ I .
The notion of coherence can be suitably generalized to the case of imprecise probability assessments. We recall below
the notion of generalized coherence (g-coherence) for interval-valued probability assessments (see, e.g., [9]).
Definition 3. An interval-valued probability assessmentA = ([α1, β1], . . . , [αn, βn]), defined on a family of n conditional
events F = {E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn}, is g-coherent if there exists a coherent precise probability assessment P = (p1, . . . , pn)
on F , with pi = P(Ei|Hi), such that αi ≤ pi ≤ βi for each i = 1, . . . , n.
Imprecise probabilities and lower/upper previsions have been largely studied in the literature; see, for instance [38,39,
84,85,89,99,101,103].
3. Checking of coherence and extension of conditional probabilities
In this section we recall some basic notions and results on axiomatic conditional probabilities; then, we briefly survey
some aspects which concern the checking of coherence and the extension of conditional probability assessments. We also
mention a property of connectionwhich holds for the set of coherent probability assessments on afinite family of conditional
events. The problem of coherence checking and extension of conditional probability assessments may have computational
difficulties which can be reduced by suitably exploiting zero probabilities. Theoretical results and algorithms related with
this aspect have been proposed in a large number of papers; see, e.g. [9,10,15–17,26,28–36,50,51,80,81,88,98,102].
Remark 1. We recall that, given an algebra of eventsA and a non empty subfamily X ⊆ A, with ∅ /∈ X , a (finitely additive)
conditional probability P on A × X is (usually looked at as) a real function defined on A × X satisfying the following
properties:
(i) P(·|H) is a finitely additive probability on A, for every H ∈ X ;
(ii) P(H|H) = 1, for every H ∈ X ;
(iii) P(AB|H) = P(B|AH)P(A|H), for every A, B,H, with A ∈ A, B ∈ A, H ∈ X , AH ∈ X .
We observe that, if P is coherent, then P satisfies all the axioms of a conditional probability; the converse is not true; for
some counterexamples, see [36, Example 13]; [51, Example 8]; [65, Section 4.1].
Some sufficient conditions for coherence of P are the following ones: (i) X is an additive class; (ii) X is a P-quasi additive
class; (iii) X ∪ {∅} is a sub-algebra of A. We recall below the notions of additive and quasi additive classes.
A family of events X is said an additive class if, for every H1,H2 in X , we have H1 ∨ H2 ∈ X .
Given a conditional probability P on A × X , the family X is said a P−quasi additive class [37] if, for every H1,H2 in X ,
there exists K ∈ X such that: (i) H1 ∨ H2 ⊆ K; (ii) P(H1|K) + P(H2|K) > 0. We observe that, for every H1,H2, it holds
P(H1 ∨ H2 |H1 ∨ H2) = 1, and
P(H1 ∨ H2 |H1 ∨ H2) ≤ P(H1 |H1 ∨ H2) + P(H2 |H1 ∨ H2).
Therefore
P(H1 |H1 ∨ H2) + P(H2 |H1 ∨ H2) ≥ 1, ∀ H1,H2. (4)
Then, given a conditional probability P onA× X , with X additive, for every H1,H2 in X we have H1 ∨ H2 ∈ X , so that from
(4) it follows that X is P-quasi additive. In particular, if X ∪{∅} is a sub-algebra ofA, then X is, of course, additive and hence
it is P-quasi additive.
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Remark 2. Given a conditional probability P defined on A× X , in a paper by Császár [37, Theorem 8.5] the equivalence of
the following propositions has been proved:
• the following condition is satisfied:
Πni=1P(Ei|Hi) = Πni=1P(Ei|Hi+1), (5)
where Ei ∈ A, Hi ∈ X , Ei ⊆ HiHi+1, and Hn+1 = H1;• there exists an extension of P to P∗ defined on A× X ∗, where X ∗ is an additive class containing X ;
• there exists an extension of P to P∗ defined on A× X ∗, where X ∗ is a P-quasi additive class containing X .
We remark that, when the involved probabilities are positive, (5) reduces to the generalized Bayes’ theorem considered in
[4].
Császár’s condition plays a relevant role for what concerns coherence of P. In fact, we have ([94]; see also [66])
Theorem 2. A conditional probability P defined on A × X , where A is an algebra of events and X is a non empty subfamily of
A, with ∅ /∈ X , is coherent if and only if, for each n, condition (5) is satisfied.
As it followsbyCsászár’s result andTheorem2, ifX isP-quasi additive (or additive; or, inparticular,X∪{∅} is a sub-algebra
of A), then P is coherent.
In [94] it is proved that a conditional probability P defined onA× X can be extended as a full conditional probability P∗
defined on A × A0, where A0 = A\{∅}. A direct proof of the coherence of P when X is P-quasi additive is given in [47]. A
result related with Theorem 2 is given below.
Corollary 1. LetP = (ai, bi, i = 1, . . . , n) be a probability assessment on the family of conditional eventsF = {Ei|Hi, Ei|Hi+1,
i = 1, 2 . . . , n}, with Ei ⊆ HiHi+1, ∀ i, Hn+1 = H1, and with ai = P(Ei|Hi), bi = P(Ei|Hi+1). If P is coherent, then
Πni=1ai = Πni=1bi, i.e. the condition (5) is satisfied.
We observe that, for every pair of events A, B, with A = ∅, we have B|A = BA|A, so that P(BA|A) = P(B|A). Then, given
three events E, F,H and applying Corollary 1, with n = 2 andwith E1 = EFH, H1 = H3 = H, E2 = H2 = FH, the condition
a1a2 = b1b2, which is necessary for the coherence of the assessment P = (ai, bi, i = 1, 2) on F = {Ei|Hi, Ei|Hi+1, i =
1, 2}, becomes P(EF|H) = P(E|FH)P(F|H); that is, the third axiomof conditional probabilities is a particular case of Császár’s
condition.
Axiomatic conditional probabilities are mainly of theoretical interest; on the other hand, when we apply probabilistic
methods to real problems, very oftenweneed to consider arbitrary finite families of conditional events. Then, a basic problem
is represented by the checking of coherence and the extension of given conditional probability assessments. This problem
can be faced by studying the solvability of (suitable sequences of) linear systems. We give below some technical details
on the checking of the coherence of a probability assessment P = (p1, . . . , pn) on a finite family of n conditional events
F = {E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn}.
An algorithm for checking coherence [50].
Denoting by Jn the set {1, . . . , n} and by S the set of solutions Λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) of the system (S), define the linear
functions
Φj(Λ) = Φ(λ1, . . . , λm) =
∑
r:Cr⊆Hj
λr, j ∈ Jn.
Moreover, consider the quantities Mj = maxΦj(Λ), j ∈ Jn, and the set I0 = {j ∈ Jn : Mj = 0}. Then, denote by (F0,P0)
the pair associated with the set I0. Given the pair (F,P) and a subset J ⊂ Jn, we defineHJ = ∨j∈J Hj; moreover, we denote
by (FJ,PJ) the pair associated with the subset J and by (SJ) the corresponding system. We observe that (SJ) is solvable iff
PJ ∈ IJ , where IJ is the convex hull associated with the pair (FJ,PJ). Then, we have
Theorem 3. Given the assessment P on F , assume that the system (S) is solvable, that is P ∈ I . Let J be a subset of Jn. If there
exists a solution (λ1, . . . , λm) of (S) such that
∑
r:Cr⊆HJ λr > 0, then the system (SJ) is solvable; i.e. PJ ∈ IJ .
Theorem 4. Given the assessment P on F , assume that the system (S) is solvable, that is P ∈ I . Then, for every subset J ⊂ Jn,
such that J\I0 = ∅, one has PJ ∈ IJ .
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Theorem 5. The assessment P on F is coherent if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. P ∈ I;
2. if I0 = ∅, then the assessment P0 on F0 is coherent.
Then, we can check coherence by the following
Algorithm 1. Let be given (Jn,F,P).
1. Construct the system (S) and check its solvability;
2. If the system (S) is not solvable then P is not coherent and the procedure stops, otherwise compute the set I0;
3. If I0 = ∅ then P is coherent and the procedure stops, otherwise set (Jn,F,P) = (I0,F0,P0) and repeat steps 1–3.
A related algorithm can be introduced for the extension of precise probability assessments. These algorithms can be
suitablymodified for the checking of generalized coherence (g-coherence) and for propagation of interval-valued conditional
probability assessments [9]. Moreover, using the modified algorithms, we can correct any given g-coherent interval-valued
probability assessment, by computing the associated interval-valued assessment coherent in the sense of [103], or [100];
see also [36].
Remark 3. As noted by Didier Dubois in 1994, Algorithm 1 is closely related to another one given in [67] for checking
ε-consistency in default reasoning.
Theorems of extension for conditional probabilities have been given in many papers [73,79,93,103]. General algorithms
concerning the extension of precise and imprecise conditional probability assessments have been proposed bymany authors
(see, e.g., [9,16,29–32,36,88,98,99,102]). A procedure for the extension of conditional probability assessments was already
proposed in [63], by exploiting some properties (such as closure and connectivity) of the sets of solutions of suitable linear
systems; but, in such procedure it was not explicitly considered the case of conditioning events of zero probability. I recall
below some related theoretical results obtained in [11,12], by illustrating in particular a connection propertywhich holds for
the set of coherent conditional probability assessments on a finite family of conditional events.
Given a family of n conditional events Fn = {E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn}, we denote by Πn the set of coherent probability
assessments Pn = (p1, . . . , pn) on Fn. Moreover, given two points: P ′ = (p′1, . . . , p′n) ∈ Πn, P ′′ = (p′′1, . . . , p′′n) ∈ Πn,
we set: pmi = min {p′i, p′′i }, pMi = max {p′i, p′′i }, i = 1, . . . , n; then, we define: Pm = (pm1 , . . . , pmn ), PM = (pM1 , . . . , pMn ).
We have
Theorem 6. Let the given two coherent assessments be P ′ = (p′1, . . . , p′n), P ′′ = (p′′1, . . . , p′′n) on Fn = {E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn}.
Then, there exists a continuous curve C with extreme points P ′,P ′′ such that:
(i) Pm ≤ P ≤ PM, ∀ P ∈ C; (ii) C ⊆ Πn.
As it is shown by (i), each point P of the curve C is a (coherent) probability assessment intermediate between P ′ and P ′′.
Moreover, the theorem is operative, as in its proof it is shown how to construct a continuous curve C, contained in Πn and
connecting P ′ with P ′′ (in general, the number of curves of this kind is infinite). By the above theorem it follows
Corollary 2. Given any quantities p1, . . . , pi−1, li ≤ ui, pi+1, . . . , pn, let us define
P ′ = (p1, . . . , pi−1, li, pi+1, . . . , pn), P ′′ = (p1, . . . , pi−1, ui, pi+1, . . . , pn).
Moreover, let 
 = P ′P ′′ be the segment {(p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pn) : li ≤ pi ≤ ui}, with set of vertices V = {P ′,P ′′}. Then:
Δ ⊆ Πn ⇐⇒ V ⊆ Πn.
The proof of Corollary 2 is obtained by observing that Δ ⊆ Πn implies V ⊆ Πn. Conversely, assuming V ⊆ Πn, as
Pm = P ′ andPM = P ′′, the unique curve C contained inΔ and connectingP ′,P ′′ is the segmentΔ itself. Then, by Theorem
6, it follows Δ ⊆ Πn.
Remark 4. By Corollary 2 and by the closure property of the setΠn, we can obtain as a further result (a simple proof of) the
theorem of extension for conditional probabilities.
In [12] the above results have been generalized to the case of interval-valued assessments; further related results have
been obtained in [13,18].
The probabilistic reasoning under coherence has been applied in [43] to the problem of probabilistic abduction without
priors.
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4. Probabilistic aspects in default reasoning
A basic aspect in nonmonotonic reasoning is the study of logical operations, such as conjunction and disjunction, among
conditionals. Logical operations among conditional events have been studied in [24]; interestingly, some parts of such paper
are related with the research of other authors, mainly in the field of artificial intelligence [25,44,68,69,95]. A comparison
with some aspects studied in the above papers (with a deepening of the notion of conditional hyperprobability) has been
made in [64]. Logical operations among conditional events have been studied also in [27], where a generalized notion of
atoms for conditional events has been proposed; moreover, a comparison between classical logic and three-valued logic for
conditional events has been made in [5]. The research on logical operations among conditional events has a natural relation
with the role of coherence in probabilistic nonmonotonic reasoning. In the setting of coherence we can examine the work
of Adams on the Logic of Conditionals, without assuming positive probabilities for the antecedents of conditional assertions.
In particular, coherence allows to examine with full generality the notions of probabilistic consistency and probabilistic
entailment.
A conditional assertion, or default (conditional object in the approach of Dubois and Prade), written A |∼ B, reads “if A, then
B” and intuitivelymeans that the probability of B|A is “high”. Then, in the coherence-based approach, probabilistic consistency
and probabilistic entailment can be defined as below.
Definition 4. The conditional knowledgebaseK = {Hj |∼ Ej, j ∈ J} isp-consistent if andonly if, for every set of lower bounds
L = {αj, j ∈ J}, there exists a coherent conditional probability assessment P = {pj, j ∈ J} defined on F = {Ej|Hj, j ∈ J},
with pj = P(Ej|Hj), such that pj ≥ αj for every j ∈ J.
Definition 5. Given two p-consistent knowledge bases K1 = {Hj |∼ Ej, j ∈ J1} and K2 = {Kj |∼ Aj, j ∈ J2}, we say that
K1 p-entails K2, denoted K1 ⇒ K2, if and only if there exists  = {Ej|Hj, j ∈ I} ⊆ F1 = {Ej|Hj, j ∈ J1} such that, for
every set of lower bounds L2 = {βj, j ∈ J2} on F2 = {Aj|Kj, j ∈ J2}, with βj ≤ 1 ∀ j, there exists a set of lower bounds
L1 = {αj, j ∈ I} on Γ such that, for every coherent conditional probability assessment P = {pj, j ∈ I ∪ J2} defined on
Γ ∪ F2, with pj = P(Ej|Hj), ∀ j ∈ I, and pj = P(Aj|Kj), ∀ j ∈ J2, if pj ≥ αj for every j ∈ I, then pj ≥ βj for every j ∈ J2.
A further notion of strict p-consistency is given below [53].
Definition 6. The knowledge base K is strictly p-consistent if the probability assessment P on K, defined as P(E|H) =
1, ∀ E|H ∈ K, is coherent.
Then, we have [54,55].
Theorem 7. K is p-consistent if and only if K is strictly p-consistent.
An inference rule is constituted by some premises, usually represented by two conditional assertions, and a conclusion,
usually represented by one conditional assertion.
In applications of intelligent systems to automated uncertain reasoning the explicit knowledge of the agent is represented
by a knowledge base K, constituted by a set of conditional assertions; the inferential process is developed using a suitable
set of inference rules.
Below are given some inference rules used in nonmonotonic reasoning, in particular in the so-called System P and P+
[1,2,7,77,87]
And : A |∼ B, A |∼ C ⇒ A |∼ BC
CM(CautiousMonotonicity) : A |∼ C, A |∼ B ⇒ AB |∼ C
OR : A |∼ C, B |∼ C ⇒ A ∨ B |∼ C
Cut : AB |∼ C, A |∼ B ⇒ A |∼ C
dWRM : A |∼ C ⇒ A |∼ Bc ∨ AB |∼ C
The last rule (disjunctive Weak Rational Monotony; [2]) in its conclusion contains a disjunction of conditionals. Another
inference rule, which plays a key role in the logic of conditional objects proposed in [45], is the QC (Quasi-Conjunction) rule
below
QC : H |∼ A, K |∼ B ⇒ H ∨ K |∼ (AH ∨ Hc) ∧ (BK ∨ Kc).
In [1] a conditional assertion A |∼ B is looked at as: P(B|A) ≥ 1 − ε (∀ε > 0). Under a more realistic point of view we
may look at the same conditional assertion as the conditional (B|A)[α, β], with 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ 1, with the probabilistic
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interpretation α ≤ P(B|A) ≤ β , where usually β = 1; in particular, we use the symbol (B|A)[x] when α = β = x. Then, a
probabilistic knowledge base is a family of conditionals: KB = {(E|H)[α, β]}.
In [36] a set of defaults is directly defined as a set of conditional events having probability one.
In [53–55] this aspect is considered by introducing the notion of strict p-consistency (which is equivalent to the notion of
p-consistency of Adams).
Related results have been given in [14,15], with a detailed analysis of complexity and the study of the relationship of
probabilistic reasoning under coherence with:
– model-theoretic probabilistic reasoning and default reasoning in System P;
– default reasoning with conditional objects [7,45].
In [57] a coherence-based probabilistic logic has been developed by introducing the notion of conditional interpretation
directly in terms of precise conditional probability assessments.
A logic with approximate conditional probabilities has been proposed for default reasoning in [92].
Probabilistic semantics of inference rules [55,56].
Given a probability assessment P on a family of conditional events K, let P be the restriction of P on F ⊆ K; moreover,
let I be the convex hull associated with the pair (F,P).
We recall that, by Theorem 1, the probability assessment P onK is coherent if and only if, for every F ⊆ K, the condition
P ∈ I is satisfied. Moreover, we point out that coherence-basedmethods allow to exactly propagate the probability bounds
from premises to conclusions in inference rules. In this way, we also obtain an exact illustration of the degradation of the
rules when interpreted in probabilistic terms.
An inference rule IR, with two premises and one conclusion, can be represented as
(E1|H1)[x], (E2|H2)[y] ⇒ (E3|H3)[z′, z′′],
where [z′, z′′] is the set of coherent extensions of the (coherent) probability assessment (x, y)on thepremises {E1|H1, E2|H2}
to the conclusion E3|H3. In the case of interval-valued assessments the inference rule becomes
(E1|H1)[α1, β1], (E2|H2)[α2, β2] ⇒ (E3|H3)[α3, β3].
In this case the consistency of the imprecise probability assessment
([α1, β1], [α2, β2], [α3, β3])
on the family {E1|H1, E2|H2, E3|H3} can be checked by suitably generalizing the notion of coherence of de Finetti, e.g., by
using the notion of g-coherence ([9]), or the notion of coherence ([36,100]; see also [14]).
The proposition below gives, in the case of precise probability assessments, the exact lower and upper bounds when
the basic events in inference rules are assumed logically independent; of course, in case of some logical dependencies, more
specific lower and upper bounds could be obtained.
Proposition 1. Let  be the set of inference rules {And, CM, OR, Cut}. Given any inference rule IR ∈ , for the interval [z′, z′′]
of the coherent extensions of the probability assessment (x, y) on the premises {E1|H1, E2|H2} to the conclusion E3|H3 we have
And rule: (B|A)[x], (C|A)[y] ⇒ (BC|A)[z′, z′′],
z′ = Max {0, x + y − 1}, z′′ = Min {x, y};
CM rule: (C|A)[x], (B|A)[y] ⇒ (C|AB)[z′, z′′],
z′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
x+y−1
y
, if x + y > 1,
0, if x + y ≤ 1, z
′′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
x
y
, if x < y,
1, if x ≥ y;
OR rule: (C|A)[x], (C|B)[y] ⇒ (C|A ∨ B)[z′, z′′],
z′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
xy
x+y−xy , if (x, y) = (0, 0),
0, if (x, y) = (0, 0), z
′′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
x+y−2xy
1−xy , if (x, y) = (1, 1),
1, if (x, y) = (1, 1);
Cut rule: (C|AB)[x], (B|A)[y] ⇒ (C|A)[z′, z′′],
z′ = xy, z′′ = xy + 1 − y.
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A sketch of the computation of lower/upper bounds for CM rule.
We give below some details concerning the computation of z′, z′′ for CM rule. Let P = (x, y, z) be a precise assessment
on F = {C|A, B|A, C|AB}. We haveH3 = A ∨ AB = A; moreover, the constituents C0, C1, . . . , C4 are, respectively,
Ac, ABC, ABCc, ABcC, ABcCc.
The points Q1, . . . ,Q4, associated with C1, . . . , C4, are
Q1 = (1, 1, 1), Q2 = (0, 1, 0), Q3 = (1, 0, z), Q4 = (0, 0, z).
To check the condition P ∈ I we have to consider the following system (in the unknowns λ1, . . . , λ4)⎧⎨
⎩ λ1 + λ3 = x, λ1 + λ2 = y, λ1 + z(λ3 + λ4) = z,λ1 + · · · + λ4 = 1, λr ≥ 0, ∀ r.
We have
ΦA(Λ) = λ1 + · · · + λ4 = 1, ΦAB(Λ) = λ1 + λ2,
so that |I0| ≤ 1. Hence, P is coherent if and only if the above system is solvable; that is, if and only if P ∈ I . By a geometrical
examination we obtain that, in the case x + y > 1, the condition P ∈ I requires
z ≥ z′ = x + y − 1
y
.
In the case x + y ≤ 1 we obtain z′ = 0, so that the condition P ∈ I is always satisfied. Then
z′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
x+y−1
y
, if x + y > 1,
0, if x + y ≤ 1.
By a similar reasoning, we obtain
z′′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
x
y
, if x < y,
1, if x ≥ y.
Still assuming the basic events logically independent, the proposition below gives, for the previous inference rules, the exact
lower and upper bounds for (coherent) interval-valued probability assessments.
Proposition 2. Let  be the set of inference rules {And, CM, OR, Cut}. Given any inference rule IR ∈ , for the interval [α3, β3]
of the (coherent) extensions of the interval-valued probability assessment ([α1, β1], [α2, β2]) on the premises {E1|H1, E2|H2} to
the conclusion E3|H3 we have
And rule: (B|A)[α1, β1], (C|A)[α2, β2] ⇒ (BC|A)[α3, β3],
α3 = Min(x,y)∈[α1,β1]×[α2,β2] z′ = Max{0, α1 + α2 − 1},
β3 = Max(x,y)∈[α1,β1]×[α2,β2] z′′ = Min{β1, β2}.
CM rule: (C|A)[α1, β1], (B|A)[α2, β2] ⇒ (C|AB)[α3, β3],
α3 =
⎧⎨
⎩
α1+α2−1
α2
, if α1 + α2 > 1,
0, if α1 + α2 ≤ 1,
β3 =
⎧⎨
⎩
β1
α2
, if β1 < α2,
1, if β1 ≥ α2.
OR rule: (C|A)[α1, β1], (C|B)[α2, β2] ⇒ (C|A ∨ B)[α3, β3],
α3 =
⎧⎨
⎩
α1α2
α1+α2−α1α2 , if (α1, α2) = (0, 0),
0, if (α1, α2) = (0, 0),
β3 =
⎧⎨
⎩
β1+β2−2β1β2
1−β1β2 , if (β1, β2) = (1, 1),
1, if (β1, β2) = (1, 1).
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Cut rule: (C|AB)[α1, β1], (B|A)[α2, β2] ⇒ (C|A)[α3, β3],
α3 = α1α2, β3 = β1α2 + 1 − α2.
Remark 5. We observe that, based on the logical independence of the basic events A, B, C, in each inference rule we have
computed the exact lower and upper bounds α3, β3, by exploiting the property that the assessment (x, y) on the premises
is coherent for every (x, y) ∈ [α1, β1] × [α2, β2]. This property amounts to the notion of total coherence [58,59] of the
(imprecise) assessment ([α1, β1], [α2, β2]) on the premises {E1|H1, E2|H2}.
Probabilistic semantics of dWRM rule.
Let us denote byΠ the set of coherent probability assessments (x, y, z) on the family {C|A, Bc|A, C|AB}, where the events
A, B, C are logically independent. Then, the probabilistic interpretation of dWRM rule is the following one:
“for every (x, y, z) ∈ Π , if x is high, then y is high, or z is high”.
In more formal terms, we have
Proposition 3. For every ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that, for every coherent assessment (x, y, z) on {C|A, Bc|A, C|AB}, it
holds
x > 1 − δ ⇒ max {y, z} > 1 − ε. (6)
Proof. We observe that the probability assessment (x, y) on {C|A, Bc|A} is coherent for every (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2; hence, for
every ε > 0, δ > 0, there exist coherent assessments (x, y), with x > 1 − δ and y > 1 − ε, or x > 1 − δ and y ≤ 1 − ε.
Moreover, we recall [55] that the assessment (x, y, z) on {C|A, Bc|A, C|AB} is coherent if and only if z′ ≤ z ≤ z′′, with
z′ =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x−y
1−y , if x > y,
0, if x ≤ y,
z′′ =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x
1−y , if x + y < 1,
1, if x + y ≥ 1.
Then, given any ε > 0 and δ > 0, for every coherent assessment (x, y, z) such that x > 1− δ and y > 1− ε, the condition
(6) is trivially satisfied becausemax {y, z} ≥ y > 1 − ε.
If y ≤ 1 − ε, the condition (6) is still satisfied because, by choosing δ = ε2, from 1 − x < ε2 and 1 − y ≥ ε it follows
1 − x
1 − y <
ε2
ε
= ε, z′ = x − y
1 − y = 1 −
1 − x
1 − y > 1 − ε,
and then:max{y, z} = z ≥ z′ > 1 − ε. 
We observe that, in the imprecise case, an interval-valued probability assessment ([α1, β1], [α2, β2]) on {C|A, Bc|A}
propagates to [α3, β3] on C|AB, with
α3 =
⎧⎨
⎩
α1−β2
1−β2 , if α1 ≥ β2,
0, if α1 < β2,
β3 =
⎧⎨
⎩
β1
1−α2 , if β1 + α2 < 1,
1, if β1 + α2 ≥ 1.
Probabilistic semantics of QC rule.
For the Quasi Conjunction rule, in the case of precise probability assessments we have [56]
(A|H)[x], (B|K)[y] ⇒ ((AH ∨ Hc) ∧ (BK ∨ Kc)|(H ∨ K))[z′, z′′],
with
z′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
x + y − 1, if x + y > 1,
0, if x + y ≤ 1, z
′′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
x+y−2xy
1−xy , if (x, y) = (1, 1),
1, if (x, y) = (1, 1);
In the case of interval-valued probability assessments we have
(A|H)[α1, β1], (B|K)[α2, β2] ⇒ ((AH ∨ Hc) ∧ (BK ∨ Kc)|(H ∨ K))[α3, β3],
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with
α3 =
⎧⎨
⎩ α1 + α2 − 1, if α1 + α2 > 1,0, if α1 + α2 ≤ 1, β3 =
⎧⎨
⎩
β1+β2−2β1β2
1−β1β2 , if (β1, β2) = (1, 1),
1, if (β1, β2) = (1, 1).
A sketch of the computation of lower/upper bounds for QC rule.
To examine some details concerning the computation of z′, z′′, let P = (x, y, z) be a precise assessment on F =
{A|H, B|K, C(A|H, B|K)}, where the events A,H, B, K are logically independent, with H = ∅, K = ∅, and where
C(A|H, B|K) = (AH ∨ Hc) ∧ (BK ∨ Kc)|(H ∨ K)
is the quasi-conjunction of the conditional events A|H and B|K . The values z′, z′′ can be obtained by studying the coherence
of P = (x, y, z) using the geometrical approach.
The constituents generated by the family F = {A|H, B|K, C(A|H, B|K)} and contained in H ∨ K are the following ones
C1 = AHBK, C2 = AHBKc, C3 = AHBcK, C4 = AHcBK,
C5 = AHcBcK, C6 = AcHBK, C7 = AcHBKc, C8 = AcHBcK.
The corresponding points Qh’s are
Q1 = (1, 1, 1), Q2 = (1, y, 1), Q3 = (1, 0, 0), Q4 = (x, 1, 1),
Q5 = (x, 0, 0), Q6 = (0, 1, 0), Q7 = (0, y, 0), Q8 = (0, 0, 0),
and, in our case, the coherence of P simply amounts to the condition P ∈ I , where I is the convex hull of Q1, . . . ,Q8.
– If x + y ≤ 1, then P = (x, y, 0) belongs to the triangle Q3Q6Q8, so that the condition P ∈ I is verified and hence:
z′ = 0.
– If x + y > 1, denoting by π1 the plane containing the triangle T1 = Q1Q3Q6 and considering the point (x, y, z′)
belonging to T1, in order the condition P ∈ I be satisfied it must be z ≥ z′.
Then, observing that the equation of π1 is
Z = X + Y − 1,
it follows z′ = x + y − 1.
– Concerning the upper bound z′′, if (x, y) = (1, 1), as z′ = 1, then z′′ = 1. In fact, P = (1, 1, z) and we have
Q1 = Q2 = Q4 = (1, 1, 1), Q3 = Q5 = (1, 0, 0), Q6 = Q7 = (0, 1, 0), Q8 = (0, 0, 0);
hence: P ∈ I ⇐⇒ z = 1, so that: z′′ = 1.
– If (x, y) = (1, 1), denoting by π2 the plane containing the triangle T2 = Q2Q4Q8 and considering the point (x, y, z′′)
belonging to T2, in order the condition P ∈ I be satisfied it must be z ≤ z′′ for every (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Then, observing that the equation of π2 is
Z = 1 − y
1 − xy · X +
1 − x
1 − xy · Y,
it follows
z′′ = x + y − 2xy
1 − xy .
A similar analysis can be made for interval-valued probability assessments.
The roleof quasi conjunction inprobabilistic nonmonotonic reasoningand its relationshipwith thenotionofp-entailment
have been studied, in the setting of coherence, in [60,61].
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5. Generalization of OR rule
In order to study OR rule in general, we set
F = {C|A, C|B, C|(A ∨ B)} = {E|H1, E|H2, E|(H1 ∨ H2)}.
Then, we consider as premises (of the general OR rule) the conditionals associated with the family F = {E|H1, E|H2, . . . ,
E|Hn}, and as conclusion the conditional assertion associated with the conditional event E | (H1 ∨ H2 ∨ · · · ∨ Hn).
We examine the propagation of the probability assessment P = (x1, . . . , xn) on the family F = {E|H1, . . . , E|Hn},
where
P(E|H1) = x1, . . . , P(E|Hn) = xn,
to the conditional event E|(H1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hn). We set
P[E|(H1 ∨ H2)] = z2, . . . , P[E|(H1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hn)] = zn; (7)
then, for each k = 2, . . . , n, we determine the interval [z′k, z′′k ] of the coherent extensions of P to the conditional event
E|(H1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hk).
For the sake of simplicity, we first consider the case n = 3. We have
Theorem 8. Given the assessmentP = (x1, x2, x3) onF = {E|H1, E|H2, E|H3}, where P(E|Hi) = xi, i = 1, 2, 3, the extension
P[E|(H1 ∨ H2 ∨ H3)] = z3 is coherent if and only if z′3 ≤ z3 ≤ z′′3 , where
z′3 =
1
1 +∑3i=1 1−xixi , z
′′
3 =
∑3
i=1 xi1−xi
1 +∑3i=1 xi1−xi .
Proof. By OR rule, the coherence of the probability assessment (x, y, z) on the family {C|A, C|B, C|(A∨B} implies: z ≥ z′ =
xy
x+y−xy ; or equivalently
1
z
≤ 1
z′
= 1
x
+ 1
y
− 1 = 1 + 1 − x
x
+ 1 − y
y
, (8)
which, based on (7), becomes
1
z2
≤ 1
z′2
= 1
x1
+ 1
x2
− 1; (9)
then, we have
1 − z′2
z′2
= r2 = 1 − x1
x1
+ 1 − x2
x2
. (10)
Notice that from the equality 1−z
z
= r one has z = 1
1+r ; then, by (10) we obtain
z′2 =
1
1 + r2 =
1
1 +∑2i=1 1−xixi .
Now, let us consider thepropagationof theprobability assessment (z2, x3)definedon {E|(H1∨H2), E|H3} toE|(H1∨H2∨H3).
By (8) and (9), it follows
1
z3
≤ 1
z2
+ 1
x3
− 1 ≤ 1
z′2
+ 1
x3
− 1 = 1
z′3
= 1
x1
+ 1
x2
+ 1
x3
− 2, (11)
from which we have
1 − z′3
z′3
= r3 = 1 − x1
x1
+ 1 − x2
x2
+ 1 − x3
x3
.
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Finally, we obtain
z′3 =
1
1 + r3 =
1
1 +∑3i=1 1−xixi . (12)
Concerning the upper bound z′′3 , by OR rule the coherence of the probability assessment (x, y, z) on the family {C|A, C|B,
C|(A ∨ B} implies
z ≤ z′′ = x + y − 2xy
1 − xy ,
which, based on (7), becomes
z2 ≤ z′′2 =
x1 + x2 − 2x1x2
1 − x1x2 . (13)
We can give an alternative representation of the upper bound z′′2 , by considering the set of coherent extensions [γ ′2, γ ′′2 ] of
the probability assessment (1 − x1, 1 − x2) on {Ec|H1, Ec|H2} to Ec|(H1 ∨ H2). As P[E|(H1 ∨ H2)] + P[Ec|(H1 ∨ H2)] = 1,
one has γ ′2 = 1 − z′′2 (and γ ′′2 = 1 − z′2); then, we could determine z′′2 by first computing γ ′2. By applying (12), with each xi
replaced by 1 − xi, we obtain
γ ′2 =
1
1 +∑2i=1 xi1−xi ;
then
z′′2 = 1 − γ ′2 =
∑2
i=1 xi1−xi
1 +∑2i=1 xi1−xi ,
z′′2
1 − z′′2
=
2∑
i=1
xi
1 − xi . (14)
Notice that: z′2 ≤ z2 ≤ z′′2 , that is: 1 − z′2 ≥ 1 − z2 ≥ 1 − z′′2 ; hence
z′2
1 − z′2
≤ z2
1 − z2 ≤
z′′2
1 − z′′2
. (15)
Then, considering the extension P[E|(H1 ∨ H2 ∨ H3)] = z3 of the probability assessment (z2, x3) on {E|(H1 ∨ H2), E|H3},
by (14) and (15) we obtain
z3
1 − z3 ≤
z2
1 − z2 +
x3
1 − x3 ≤
z′′2
1 − z′′2
+ x3
1 − x3 =
3∑
i=1
xi
1 − xi =
z′′3
1 − z′′3
. (16)
Therefore
z′′3 =
∑3
i=1 xi1−xi
1 +∑3i=1 xi1−xi =
α1 − 2α2 + 3α3
1 − α2 + 2α3 , (17)
where
α1 = x1 + x2 + x3; α2 = x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3; α3 = x1x2x3. 
More in general, we have
Theorem 9. Let be given a probability assessment P = (x1, . . . , xn) on the family F = {E|H1, . . . , E|Hn}, where the events
E,H1, . . . ,Hn are logically independent andwhere P(E|H1) = x1, . . . , P(E|Hn) = xn. The extension P[E|(H1∨· · ·∨Hn)] = zn
is coherent if and only if z′n ≤ zn ≤ z′′n , with
z′n =
1
1 +∑ni=1 1−xixi , z
′′
n =
∑n
i=1 xi1−xi
1 +∑ni=1 xi1−xi .
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Proof. By iterating (11), we obtain
1
zn
≤ 1
zn−1
+ 1
xn
− 1 ≤ 1
z′n−1
+ 1
xn
− 1 = 1
z′n
= 1
x1
+ · · · + 1
xn
− (n − 1)
= 1 + 1 − x1
x1
+ · · · + 1 − xn
xn
= 1 +
n∑
i=1
1 − xi
xi
= 1 + rn.
Then
1 − z′n
z′n
= rn =
n∑
i=1
1 − xi
xi
, z′n =
1
1 + rn =
1
1 +∑ni=1 1−xixi . (18)
Concerning the upper bound z′′n , by iterating (16) and (17), we obtain
z′′n
1 − z′′n
=
n∑
i=1
xi
1 − xi , z
′′
n =
∑n
i=1 xi1−xi
1 +∑ni=1 xi1−xi .  (19)
Remark 6. We recall that the odds associated with a probability assessment P(E) = p is given by the ratio p
1−p , while the
odds against E is
1−p
p
; then, as shown by the previous results, for OR rule we have that
1. the odds against E|(H1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hn) associated with the lower bound z′n, that is 1−z
′
n
z′n
, is the sum of the odds
1 − x1
x1
, . . . ,
1 − xn
xn
,
against E|H1, . . . , E|Hn, associated with the assessment
P(E|H1) = x1, . . . , P(E|Hn) = xn;
2. the odds associated with the upper bound z′′n , that is
z′′n
1−z′′n , is the sum of the odds
x1
1 − x1 , . . . ,
xn
1 − xn ,
associated with the assessment
P(E|H1) = x1, . . . , P(E|Hn) = xn.
Formulas (18) and (19) also illustrate the degradation of OR rule; that is, the intervals given by the lower and upper
bounds are getting wider and wider as more events are added to the disjunction. We preliminarily observe that, from (18)
and (19), we have
1 − z′n
z′n
≥ 1 − xi
xi
,
z′′n
1 − z′′n
≥ xi
1 − xi , i = 1, . . . , n,
which amounts to z′n ≤ xi, z′′n ≥ xi, i = 1, . . . , n; hence, by setting
mn = min{x1, . . . , xn}, μn = max{x1, . . . , xn},
it holds: z′n ≤ mn ≤ μn ≤ z′′n , z′′n − z′n ≥ μn − mn.
Moreover, defining
1−xi
xi
= ai, i = 1, . . . , n, we have 1z′i =
1
z′i−1
+ ai ≥ 1z′i−1 , so that: z
′
i ≤ z′i−1, i = 3, . . . , n. In
particular, one has z′n−1 − z′n = anz′n−1z′n, from which it follows
z′n =
z′n−1
1 + anz′n−1
= z
′
n−2
1 + (an−1 + an)z′n−2
= · · · = z
′
2
1 + z′2∑ni=3 ai =
z′2
1 + z′2∑ni=3 1−xixi .
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Concerning upper bounds, from (19) we have
z′′n
1 − z′′n
= z
′′
n−1
1 − z′′n−1
+ xn
1 − xn = · · · =
z′′2
1 − z′′2
+
n∑
i=3
xi
1 − xi ;
then
z′′n =
xn + (1 − 2xn)z′′n−1
1 − xnz′′n−1
= z′′n−1 +
xn(1 − z′′n−1)2
1 − xnz′′n−1
≥ z′′n−1.
We also have
z′′n =
xn
1−xn + z′′n−1(1 − xn1−xn )
1 + xn
1−xn − z′′n−1 · xn1−xn
= · · · =
∑n
i=3 xi1−xi + z′′2 (1 −
∑n
i=3 xi1−xi )
1 +∑ni=3 xi1−xi − z′′2 ∑ni=3 xi1−xi .
To illustrate by a numerical example the degradation of OR rule, let us assume for instance x1 = · · · = xn = 12 ; by applying
(18) and (19), with n = 2, 3, . . ., we obtain
[z′2, z′′2 ] =
[
1
3
,
2
3
]
, [z′3, z′′3 ] =
[
1
4
,
3
4
]
, . . . , [z′n, z′′n ] =
[
1
n + 1 ,
n
n + 1
]
.
As shown by the example, in the present case of a disjunctive conclusion (we have μn − mn = 0, n = 2, 3, . . ., and at the
same time) inferences are getting very imprecise as more premises are added.
6. Generalization of CM rule
For the sake of simplicity, we first consider the case with three premises B|A, C|A, D|A and a conclusion D|ABC. We have
Theorem 10. Given the probability assessment P(D|A) = x, P(C|A) = y, P(B|A) = z, the extension P(D|ABC) = γ is coherent
if and only if γ ′ ≤ γ ≤ γ ′′, with
γ ′ = max
{
0,
x + y + z − 2
y + z − 1
}
, γ ′′ = min
{
1,
x
y + z − 1
}
.
Proof. We set P(BC|A) = u; then, by applying AND rule, from P(C|A) = y, P(B|A) = z it follows u′ ≤ u ≤ u′′, with
u′ = max{0, y + z − 1}, u′′ = min{y, z}.
By CM rule, from P(D|A) = x, P(BC|A) = u, it follows γ ′u ≤ P(D|ABC) ≤ γ ′′u , with
γ ′u = max
{
0,
x + u − 1
u
}
, γ ′′u = min
{
x
u
, 1
}
.
By observing that, if y + z − 1 > 0, then
x + u − 1
u
≥ x + u
′ − 1
u′
= x + y + z − 2
y + z − 1 ,
x
u
≤ x
u′
= x
y + z − 1 ,
it follows
γ ′ = minu′≤u≤u′′ γ ′u = max
{
0,
x + y + z − 2
y + z − 1
}
,
γ ′′ = maxu′≤u≤u′′ γ ′′u = min
{
1,
x
y + z − 1
}
. 
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An equivalent method to compute γ ′′ is the following one:
– by CM rule, from P(Dc|A) = 1 − x, P(BC|A) = u it follows
P(Dc|ABC) ≤ δ′ = max
{
0,
1 − x + y + z − 2
y + z − 1
}
;
then
γ ′′ = 1 − δ′ = 1 − max
{
0,
1 − x + y + z − 2
y + z − 1
}
= 1 − max
{
0, 1 − x
y + z − 1
}
= min
{
1,
x
y + z − 1
}
.
In order to examine in general CM rule, we denote the family {D|A, C|A, B|A,D|ABC} by {A3|A0, A2|A0, A1|A0, A3|A0A1A2};
moreover, we denote the assessment (x, y, z, γ ) by (x3, x2, x1, γ3). Then, by Theorem 10, we have γ
′
3 ≤ γ3 ≤ γ ′′3 , with
γ ′3 = max
{
0,
x1 + x2 + x3 − 2
x1 + x2 − 1
}
, γ ′′3 = min
{
1,
x3
x1 + x2 − 1
}
.
Then, we have
Theorem11. Given a probability assessment (x1, x2, . . . , xn) on the premises {A1|A0, A2|A0, . . . , An|A0}, where A0, A1, . . . , An
are logically independent events and where xk = P(Ak|A0), the extension P(An | A0A1 · · · An−1) = γn is coherent if and only if
γ ′n ≤ γn ≤ γ ′′n , with
γ ′n = max
{
0,
x1 + · · · + xn − (n − 1)
x1 + · · · + xn−1 − (n − 2)
}
, γ ′′n = min
{
1,
xn
x1 + · · · + xn−1 − (n − 2)
}
. (20)
Proof. We set P(A1 · · · An−1|A0) = un−1; then, by AND rule, from P(A1|A0) = x1, . . . , P(An−1|A0) = xn−1 it follows
u′n−1 ≤ un−1 ≤ u′′n−1, with
u′n−1 = max{0, x1 + · · · + xn−1 − (n − 2)}, u′′n−1 = min{x1, . . . , xn−1}.
By CM rule, from P(An|A0) = xn, P(A1 · · · An−1|A0) = un−1 it follows
γ ′un−1 ≤ P(An|A0A1 · · · An−1) ≤ γ ′′un−1 ,
with
γ ′un−1 = max
{
0,
un−1 + xn − 1
un−1
}
, γ ′′un−1 = min
{
xn
un−1
, 1
}
.
By observing that, if x1 + · · · + xn−1 − (n − 2) > 0, then
un−1 + xn − 1
un−1
≥ u
′
n−1 + xn − 1
u′n−1
= x1 + · · · + xn − (n − 1)
x1 + · · · + xn−1 − (n − 2) ,
xn
un−1
≤ xn
u′n−1
= xn
x1 + · · · + xn−1 − (n − 2) ,
it follows
γ ′n = minu′n−1≤un−1≤u′′n−1 γ ′un−1 = max
{
0,
x1 + · · · + xn − (n − 1)
x1 + · · · + xn−1 − (n − 2)
}
= max
{
0,
xn − (1 − x1) − · · · − (1 − xn−1)
1 − (1 − x1) − · · · − (1 − xn−1)
}
,
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γ ′′n = maxu′n−1≤un−1≤u′′n−1 γ ′′un−1 = min
{
1,
xn
x1 + · · · + xn−1 − (n − 2)
}
= min
{
1,
xn
1 − (1 − x1) − · · · − (1 − xn−1)
}
. 
Concerning the degradation of CM rule, we preliminarily observe thatwhen x1 = · · · = xn, say xi = 1−ε, i = 1, . . . , n,
then γ ′′n = 1, γ ′n = 1−nε1−(n−1)ε , with γ ′n = 0 if n > 1ε . In general, we have
γ ′n > 0, γ ′′n < 1 ⇐⇒
n−1∑
i=1
(1 − xi) < xn < 1 −
n−1∑
i=1
(1 − xi),
with
γ ′′n − γ ′n =
∑n−1
i=1 (1 − xi)
1 −∑n−1i=1 (1 − xi) .
Assuming for instance xi = 1 − εi, i = 1, . . . , n, with
n−1∑
i=1
εi <
1
2
,
n−1∑
i=1
εi < εn < 1 −
n−1∑
i=1
εi,
we have
γ ′n =
1 −∑ni=1 εi
1 −∑n−1i=1 εi , γ
′′
n =
1 − εn
1 −∑n−1i=1 εi , γ
′′
n − γ ′n =
∑n−1
i=1 εi
1 −∑n−1i=1 εi .
We observe that, by increasing the number of premises from n − 1 to n, the ‘imprecision’ in the inference increases from
γ ′′n−1 − γ ′n−1 =
∑n−2
i=1 εi
1 −∑n−2i=1 εi
to
γ ′′n − γ ′n =
∑n−2
i=1 εi + εn−1
1 −∑n−2i=1 εi − εn−1 .
In particular:
∑n−1
i=1 εi = 0 implies γ ′n = γ ′′n = 1 − εn; moreover
∑n−1
i=1 εi  12 implies εn  12 and [γ ′n, γ ′′n ]  [0, 1].
7. Generalization of Cut rule
We first consider the case with three premises D|ABC, C|A, B|A and a conclusion D|A. We have
Theorem 12. Given the probability assessment P(D|ABC) = x, P(C|A) = y, P(B|A) = z, the extension P(D|A) = γ is coherent
if and only if γ ′ ≤ γ ≤ γ ′′, with γ ′ = max{0, x(y + z − 1)} and γ ′′ = min{1, 1 − (1 − x)(y + z − 1)}.
Proof. We set P(BC|A) = u; then, by AND rule, from P(C|A) = y, P(B|A) = z it follows u′ ≤ u ≤ u′′, with: u′ =
max{0, y + z − 1}; u′′ = min{y, z}.
By Cut rule, from P(D|ABC) = x, P(BC|A) = u it follows γ ′u ≤ P(D|A) ≤ γ ′′u , with: γ ′u = xu, γ ′′u = xu − u + 1. By
observing that:
(a) xu ≥ xu′ = max{0, x(y + z − 1)},
(b) xu − u + 1 = 1− (1− x)u ≤ 1− (1− x)u′ = 1− max{0, (1− x)(y + z − 1)} = min{1, 1− (1− x)(y + z − 1)},
it follows:
γ ′ = minu′≤u≤u′′ γ ′u = max{0, x(y + z − 1)};
γ ′′ = maxu′≤u≤u′′ γ ′′u = min{1, 1 − (1 − x)(y + z − 1)}. 
In general, we have
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Theorem13. Given theprobability assessment (x1, x2, . . . , xn)on thepremises {A1|A0, . . . , An−1|A0, An|A0A1 · · · An−1},where
A0, A1, . . . , An are logically independent events and where
xk = P(Ak|A0), k = 1, . . . , n − 1, xn = P(An|A0A1 · · · An−1),
the extension P(An | A0) = γn is coherent if and only if γ ′n ≤ γn ≤ γ ′′n , with
γ ′n = max
⎧⎨
⎩0, xn
⎡
⎣1 − n−1∑
i=1
(1 − xi)
⎤
⎦
⎫⎬
⎭ , γ ′′n = min
⎧⎨
⎩1, 1 − (1 − xn)
⎡
⎣1 − n−1∑
i=1
(1 − xi)
⎤
⎦
⎫⎬
⎭ . (21)
Proof. We set P(A1 · · · An−1|A0) = un−1; then, by AND rule, from
P(A1|A0) = x1, . . . , P(An−1|A0) = xn−1
it follows u′n−1 ≤ un−1 ≤ u′′n−1, with
u′n−1 = max{0, x1 + · · · + xn−1 − (n − 2)}, u′′n−1 = min{x1, . . . , xn−1}.
By Cut rule, from P(An|A0A1 · · · An−1) = xn, P(A1 · · · An−1|A0) = un−1 it follows γ ′un−1 ≤ P(An|A0) ≤ γ ′′un−1 , with
γ ′un−1 = xnun−1 ≥ xnu′n−1 = max
⎧⎨
⎩0, xn
⎡
⎣1 − n−1∑
i=1
(1 − xi)
⎤
⎦
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
γ ′′un−1 = 1 − (1 − xn)un−1 ≤ 1 − (1 − xn)u′n−1.
Then
γ ′n = minu′n−1≤un−1≤u′′n−1 γ ′un−1 = xnu′n−1 = max
⎧⎨
⎩0, xn
⎡
⎣1 − n−1∑
i=1
(1 − xi)
⎤
⎦
⎫⎬
⎭ ;
γ ′′n = maxu′n−1≤un−1≤u′′n−1 γ ′′un−1 = 1 − (1 − xn)u′n−1 = min
⎧⎨
⎩1, 1 − (1 − xn)
⎡
⎣1 − n−1∑
i=1
(1 − xi)
⎤
⎦
⎫⎬
⎭ . 
Concerning the degradation of Cut rule, assuming 0 < xn < 1, we have
γ ′n > 0, γ ′′n < 1 ⇐⇒
n−1∑
i=1
(1 − xi) < 1,
with γ ′′n − γ ′n = xn + (1 − xn)
∑n−1
i=1 (1 − xi) − xn + xn
∑n−1
i=1 (1 − xi) =
∑n−1
i=1 (1 − xi) = (γ ′′n−1 − γ ′n−1) + (1 − xn−1).
Hence, by increasing the number of premises from n− 1 to n the ‘imprecision’ in the inference increases by the quantity
1−xn−1; then, the lower bounds (resp., upper bounds) quickly approach 0 (resp., 1) as n increases, evenwhen the quantities
x1, x2, . . . are high. This aspect is especially interesting as the CUT rule is closely related to the Modus Ponens, the most
important inference rule in classical logic.
As an example, assuming xi = p ∈ (0, 1) for every i, we have
n−1∑
i=1
(1 − xi) = (n − 1)(1 − p) < 1 ⇐⇒ n < 1 + 1
1 − p ⇐⇒ p > 1 −
1
n − 1 .
8. Lower and upper probability bounds, t-norms and t-conorms
In this section we show that the lower and upper bounds obtained when applying OR and Quasi Conjunction rules
coincide with some well known t-norms and t-conorms, which we recall below (see [76]).
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Definition 7. A t-norm is a binary operation T on the unit interval [0, 1], i.e., a function T : [0, 1]2 −→ [0, 1], such that for
all x, y, z ∈ [0, 1] the following four axioms are satisfied:
(T1) T(x, y) = T(y, x). (commutativity)
(T2) T(x, T(y, z)) = T(T(x, y), z). (associativity)
(T3) T(x, y) ≤ T(x, z) whenever y ≤ z. (monotonicity)
(T4) T(x, 1) = x. (boundary condition)
Definition 8. A t-conorm is a binary operation S on the unit interval [0, 1], i.e., a function S : [0, 1]2 −→ [0, 1], which for
all x, y, z ∈ [0, 1] satisfies (T1)–(T3) and
(S4) S(x, 0) = x. (boundary condition)
The Lukasiewicz t-norm TL is defined as
TL(x, y) = max(x + y − 1, 0).
The Hamacher t-norm is defined as
THλ (x, y) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
TD(x, y), λ = ∞,
0, λ = x = y = 0,
xy
λ+(1−λ)(x+y−xy) , otherwise,
where the t-norm TD(x, y) (drastic product) is defined as
TD(x, y) =
⎧⎨
⎩ 0, (x, y) ∈ [0, 1)
2,
min(x, y), otherwise.
In particular, the Hamacher t-norm TH0 is
TH0 (x, y) =
⎧⎨
⎩ 0, x = y = 0,xy
x+y−xy , otherwise.
The Hamacher t-conorm SHλ , with parameter λ ∈ [0,∞], is defined as
SHλ (x, y) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
SD(x, y), λ = ∞,
1, λ = 0, x = y = 1,
x+y−xy−(1−λ)xy
1−(1−λ)xy , otherwise,
where the t-conorm SD(x, y) (drastic sum) is defined as
SD(x, y) =
⎧⎨
⎩ 1, (x, y) ∈ (0, 1]
2,
max(x, y), otherwise.
In particular, the Hamacher t-conorm SH0 is
SH0 (x, y) =
⎧⎨
⎩ 1, x = y = 1,x+y−2xy
1−xy , otherwise.
Based on the previous notions we have
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Proposition 4. Given a probability assessment (x, y) on the premises {C|A, C|B} of the OR rule, with A, B, C logically independent
events, the lower and upper bounds, z′, z′′, of the coherent extensions on the conclusion C|A ∨ B coincide respectively with the
Hamacher t-norm and Hamacher t-conorm, with λ = 0; that is
z′ = TH0 (x, y), z′′ = SH0 (x, y).
Moreover, we have
Proposition 5. Given a probability assessment (x, y) on the premises {A|H, B|K} of the QC rule, with A, B, H, K logically inde-
pendent events, concerning the lower and upper bounds, z′, z′′, of the coherent extensions on the conclusion (AH ∨ Hc) ∧ (BK ∨
Kc)|(H ∨ K) we have that z′ coincides with the Lukasiewicz t-norm, while the upper bound z′′ coincides with the Hamacher
t-conorm, with λ = 0; that is
z′ = TL(x, y), z′′ = SH0 (x, y).
The coincidence, in QC rule, between the upper bound z′′ and Hamacher t-conorm SH0 (x, y) was noted by Didier Dubois
during aWorkshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (Special Session on “Uncertainty Frameworks in Non-Monotonic Reasoning”
organized by S. Benferhat and H. Prade), Whistler BC, Canada, June 6–8, 2004.
9. Conclusions
In this paper I have first recalled some basic notions and results related to the coherence-based probabilistic treatment of
uncertainty. Then, I have deepened someaspects in probabilistic nonmonotonic reasoning, by studying generalizations ofOR,
CM, and Cut rules. In the setting of coherence, the probability bounds are exactly propagated from premises to conclusions;
then, I have illustrated in a preciseway, also by numerical examples, the degradation of the inference ruleswhen the number
of premises increases. Finally, I have shown that the lower probability bounds obtained for the conclusions when applying
OR and QC rules coincide, respectively, with Hamacher and Lukasiewicz t-norms; the upper probability bounds in both rules
coincide with Hamacher t-conorm.
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